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Introduction 
The new marijuana federalism is here, but is it here to stay? In 
this Article, I address that question by way of two related points, a 
practical one and a technical one, and I ultimately argue that state 
regulation should have a bigger role in fixing the limits of federal 
constitutional power. 
The practical point is that the current regime of state marijuana 
legalization is unstable, and it is a miracle that it is working as well 
as it is. Because marijuana remains contraband at the federal level, 
businesses and lawmakers who invest in responsible legalization at the 
state level have no guarantee their investments are safe from the 
whims of federal law enforcement. Moreover, even if the federal drug 
laws are not actively enforced in those states, the laws create serious 
problems for banks, lawyers, and others who might otherwise want to 
work with the in-state marijuana industry.  
 
†  Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law 
School. This Article was prepared for a conference on Marijuana, 
Federal Power, and the States at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. Thanks to the other participants in that conference, as 
well as Josh Blackman, Josh Chafetz, Nathan Chapman, Heather 
Gerken, Aziz Huq, Allison LaCroix, Jim Leitzel, Michael McConnell, 
Robert Mikos, Zach Price, Richard Re, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, and 
Catherine Sharkey for their comments. Further thanks to Nickolas Card 
for helpful and dedicated research assistance, and the Alumni Faculty 
Fund and SNR Denton Fund for research support.  
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The technical point is that this instability can be traced to an 
importantly erroneous footnote in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gonzales v. Raich.1 Footnote 38 claims that state law can never be 
relevant to the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
or the Necessary and Proper Clause. That conclusion is wrong, is not 
required by the rest of the Court’s enumerated powers jurisprudence, 
and should be cast aside. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause2 should be interpreted to give 
states a bigger role in determining when the federal drug laws are 
constitutional. Congress’s power to reach purely in-state conduct is 
premised on the possibility of interstate spillovers. If a state legalizes 
and regulates a drug in a way that minimizes the risk of spillovers 
into the interstate black market, the federal drug laws should be 
forbidden to apply within that state. This both creates a more stable 
set of incentives for states to responsibly manage local behavior and 
provides a more satisfactory formal grounding for the executive 
nonenforcement policy. 
I. The New Marijuana Federalism 
A. The Legal Landscape 
Federal law bans the distribution or possession of marijuana. 
That has been true since the Controlled Substances Act3 was enacted 
in 1970 and remains unchanged today. The major blip was a 
constitutional challenge to the scope of the federal ban, which was 
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich.4  
State marijuana law, however, has changed dramatically. Twenty 
years ago, marijuana was illegal in every state. In 2005, when the 
Court decided Raich, there were up to eleven states that authorized 
the use of marijuana for medical purposes.5 The Raich Court upheld 
the federal ban in broad terms, which might have suggested that 
there was no point in further state legalization. Nonetheless, in the 
 
1. 545 U.S. 1, 29 n.38 (2005). 
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
3. 21 U.S.C. ch.13, § 801 (2012). 
4. 545 U.S. 1. See id. at 10–15 for the statutory scheme and historical 
background. The minor blips are the federal “Compassionate IND” 
program, which supplies four people with medical marijuana as the 
result of an old lawsuit, and a handful of research programs. 1 Gerald 
Uelmen, Victor Haddox, & Alex Kreit, Drug Abuse and the 
Law Sourcebook §§ 1:25, 3:83 (2012 ed.). 
5. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 n.1. I say “up to eleven” because the Court 
appeared uncertain about two states: Arizona and Montana. Id. 
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past nine years, the state legalizations have more than doubled. There 
are now twenty-three states in which medical marijuana is legal.6  
More dramatically, four of those states—first Colorado and 
Washington, and more recently Alaska and Oregon—have also 
recently legalized marijuana for recreational purposes as well. The 
change came from popular initiatives and is now implemented by the 
state government in both Colorado and Washington.7 In those two 
states, adults can now purchase marijuana without any need to show 
a medical purpose.8 
All of this might remain largely symbolic if federal laws were 
aggressively enforced against illegal marijuana in every state. But of 
course they are not. Indeed, the federal government has announced an 
evolving policy of nonenforcement in states with legal marijuana.9 In 
2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued one memo to 
U.S. Attorneys suggesting that prosecuting seriously ill people who 
used state-legal medical marijuana was “unlikely to be an efficient use 
of limited federal resources.”10 In 2011, Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole issued another memorandum purporting to clarify that 
“[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield” profitable 
or “large-scale” cultivation of marijuana even where permitted under 
 
6. State Medical Marijuana Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legis-
latures (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-
medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
7. Oregon and Alaska legalized recreational use through voter referendums 
in 2014, but neither state will likely begin commercial states of mari-
juana until 2016. Shelby Sebens, Legal Toking Still Months Away 
Despite Pot Votes in Alaska, Oregon, Reuters, Nov. 5, 2014, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-usa-elections-marijuana-idUSK 
BN0IP1EB20141105. 
8. Colo Const. art. 18, § 16 (codifying Colorado Amendment 64); Wash. 
Rev. Code. § 69.50.331 (Supp. 2015). 
9. In December 2014, as this Article was being edited, Congress passed and 
the President signed a continuing funding resolution that included the 
following provision: “None of the funds made available in this Act to the 
Department of Justice may be used, with respect to [various states] to 
prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that 
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical 
marijuana.” Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). It is 
unclear whether (or how) this language restricts federal marijuana 
prosecutions of private individuals, or whether it will be reenacted in 
future appropriations. 
10. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected 
U.S. Att’ys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the 
Medical Use of Marijuana 2 (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijua 
na.pdf (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review).  
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a state’s medical marijuana laws.11 In 2013, Cole issued a memo 
regarding the Colorado and Washington initiatives, stressing that 
“prosecutors should not consider the size or commercial nature of a 
marijuana operation alone” but rather should also consider “the 
existence of a strong and effective state regulatory system, and an 
operation’s compliance with such a system.”12 
As a practical matter, states have been given some room to make 
decisions about whether marijuana should be legal and how its use 
should be managed. For those who accept the standard policy argu-
ments for decentralization—diversity of preferences, localizing exter-
nalities, and policy innovation13—this should be welcome news. Yet 
marijuana’s continued categorical illegality at the federal level renders 
this a costly and poor way to accomplish decentralization. 
B. The Costs of the Status Quo 
The new marijuana federalism—a federalism accomplished 
through state legalization and federal nonenforcement—is problematic 
for those who support decentralization. First, the status quo imposes 
human costs on producers and consumers in the marijuana business. 
It might be good for those who opposed decentralization in the first 
place, but that is not the premise from which the relevant states or 
the executive branch appear to be proceeding. Second, the status quo 
gives states little incentive to behave well in setting up their own 
legal regime. As we will see, there are ways states might act to 
minimize interstate spillovers or otherwise legalize more responsibly, 
yet they are given little incentive to do so. It is therefore impressive 
that things are going as well as they are. 
Despite the nonenforcement policy, the mere existence of the 
federal ban threatens the kinds of services that help regulated com-
mercial enterprises thrive. For instance, federal law likely does not 
allow banks to serve the industry, though recent enforcement 
guidance indicates that these rules will not be enforced against banks 
 
11. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. 
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking 
to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 2 (June 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-
guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf (on file with Case Western 
Reserve Law Review).  
12. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. 
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) 
[hereinafter Cole Enforcement Memorandum], available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (on file with 
Case Western Reserve Law Review).  
13. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Found-
ers’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493–1500 (1987). 
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that comply with certain additional requirements.14 It is not clear 
whether lawyers can advise in-state dispensaries without being guilty 
of criminal conspiracy or accomplice liability.15 And in the Western 
states, water is also critical: a recent policy issued by the Federal 
Bureau of Reclamation declared that “Reclamation will not approve 
use of Reclamation facilities or water in the cultivation of 
marijuana.”16 
Dispensaries themselves are burdened by the unenforced federal 
law as well. For instance, they might be held civilly liable under the 
federal racketeering statute, which is outside executive control.17 Some 
reports also suggest that the federal ban makes it “hard to form any 
contractual relationship” relating to marijuana at all.18  
In addition to these costs from the unenforced federal ban, there 
is an additional cloud over any state marijuana regime: federal 
enforcement policy can change. The memoranda themselves illustrate 
this, as each takes a different position from the previous one on how 
to assess marijuana producers who comply with state law. If these 
policy changes can take place within a few years and in a single 
political administration, it is hard to see how there will be a secure 
space for state policy going forward. 
In light of all this, it is striking that the states have done as well 
as they have. Legalized marijuana has not led to widespread anarchy. 
At least one study hints at positive effects from state medical 
marijuana laws.19 A report by John Hudak of the Brookings Institu-
 
14. See Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, 
BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses 
(Feb. 14, 2014); Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., 
to All U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial 
Crimes 2–3 (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
waw/press/newsblog%20pdfs/DAG%20Memo%20%20Guidance%20Rega
rding%20Marijuana%20Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%20
14%20%282%29.pdf (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review). 
But see Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 597 (2015) (detailing “the marijuana banking 
problem”). 
15. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 
91 Or. L. Rev. 869, 886–99 (2013). 
16. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, PEC TRMR-63, Use of Reclama-
tion Water or Facilities for Activities Prohibited by the 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 2 (2014). 
17. Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s 
New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 633, 
649–56 (2011). 
18. Sam Kamin, Marijuana at the Crossroads: Keynote Address, 89 Denv. 
U. L. Rev. 977, 985 (2012). 
19. See, e.g., D. Mark Anderson, Benjamin Hansen & Daniel I. Rees, 
Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol Consumption, 
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tion concludes that the “initial implementation” of Colorado’s recrea-
tional marijuana law has been “largely successful,” attributing this 
“strong rollout” to leadership by state officials and sustained effort 
from various institutions in the state.20  
Colorado’s implementation in particular also includes some steps 
that may reduce the illegal diversion of marijuana to other states. 
Though Colorado does not prevent out-of-state visitors from 
purchasing marijuana, it has limited purchases to a modest amount.21 
There are arguments that such limits are an effective way to prevent 
black market diversions,22 and the state also has a variety of 
regulations to protect the integrity of the production and distribution 
process.23 The official task force also recommended “additional 
actions . . . to limit diversion out of Colorado, such as point-of-sale 
information to out-of-state consumers, signage at airports and near 
borders, coordination with neighboring states regarding drug inter-
diction, and restricting retail licenses near the borders.”24  
Early reports, however, suggest that there may nonetheless be 
substantial diversion of marijuana out of Colorado. The quantity 
limits are easily evaded because purchases are not tracked and visitors 
can purchase the limit from multiple stores, even in a single day.25 
Moreover, interactions between the state’s growing limits and the 
state’s possession limits may be leading to leakage into the black 
market.26 Officials in some neighboring states claim that Colorado 
marijuana has led to large increases in marijuana trafficking in their 
 
56 J. L. & Econ. 333, 334 (2013) (“The first full year after coming into 
effect, the legalization of medical marijuana is associated with an 8–11 
percent decrease in traffic fatalities.”). 
20. John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A 
Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 649, 651–52 (2015). 
21. See State of Colorado, Task Force Report on the Implement-
ation of Amendment 64, at 49–50 (2013) (“[One] ounce is the largest 
amount that should be sold at any one time to any one customer.”). 
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., Colo. Code Regs. §§ 212-2.202, 212-2.231, 212-2.801 (2014). 
See also Colorado Task Force Report, supra note 21, at 16–18 
(providing recommendations for a regulatory structure in which to 
implement the Colorado Amendment). 
24. Colorado Task Force Report, supra note 21, at 50. 
25. Miles K. Light et al., Market Size and Demand for Marijuana 
in Colorado 21 (2014).  
26. Steve Lynn, Low-Cost Street Weed Gives Legal Vendors Heartburn, 
BizWest, Apr. 18, 2014, http://bizwest.com/low-cost-street-weed-gives-
legal-vendors-heartburn-2/. 
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state,27 and two states have even filed suit against Colorado in the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.28 A report by an enforcement 
group claims that diversion to other states is extensive.29  
Similarly, Washington’s recreational marijuana regime imposes 
quantity limits30 and gives the state liquor control board extensive 
control over dispensaries.31 But fewer than half of the licensed stores 
have even begun selling recreational marijuana,32 so it is too soon to 
tell what the spillovers are or will be.  
Whatever the ultimate empirical judgments on these matters, if 
one thinks that decentralization has benefits, constitutional federalism 
doctrine can and should be structured to encourage the states to 
succeed. States have taken at least some steps to reduce spillovers and 
diversion, even without any incentive to do so. A sounder constitu-
tional federalism doctrine would actually harness and encourage such 
state responsibility by making the constitutionality of federal law turn 
in part on what the state has accomplished. 
II. A Constitutional Role for State Law 
A. The Affirmative Case 
Let’s start, as the Supreme Court once said, “with first 
principles.”33 The federal marijuana laws, like any federal law, are 
 
27. See Trevor Hughes, In Tiny Nebraska Towns, a Flood of Colorado 
Marijuana, USA Today, June 12, 2014, at 3A; Jenny Deam, Colorado 
Pot Doesn’t Stay Put; Neighboring States See an Uptick in Drug Arrests 
as Marijuana Flows Illegally Across Their Borders, L.A. Times, May 
27, 2014, at A1; Jack Healy, After 5 Months of Sales, Colorado Sees the 
Downside of a Legal High, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2014, at A14; see also 
Trafficking Colorado’s Pot to Neighboring States, CBS News (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/marijuana-drug-trafficking-colora 
dos-pot-crosses-border-to-surrounding-states/; Gene Johnson, How Will 
Washington Keep Weed from Crossing the Border?, Katu. 
com, http://www.katu.com/news/business/How-will-Washington-keep-
weed-from-crossing-the-border-marijuana-188845081.html (last updated 
Dec. 5, 2013, 4:49 PM). 
28. Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 22O144 ORG (U.S. docketed 
Dec. 18, 2014). 
29. Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, The 
Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado: The Impact 37–49 
(2013). 
30. Wash. Admin. Code § 314-55-095(3) (West 2014). 
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.334 (2014). 
32. Donna G. Blankinship, Washington Pot Sales Reach $3.8M in 1st 
Month, The Wash. Times, Aug. 8, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2014/aug/8/38-million-in-1st-month-of-washington-pot-sales/. 
33. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
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constitutionally permissible only to the extent that they fall within 
Congress’s enumerated powers. While those powers probably give 
Congress some power, even a broad power, to prohibit marijuana, 
there are some limits to that power. In particular, Congress’s power 
to regulate in-state marijuana calls for some inquiry into whether that 
regulation is actually necessary. While the Court’s cases do not 
always adopt this framework clearly, almost all of them are consistent 
with it.34 
Congress has no affirmative, explicit power to regulate marijuana 
generally, or even all national commerce. Rather, its enumerated 
powers are “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States” and 
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” that power.35 In-state marijuana is outside the direct 
scope of the federal commerce power and must be justified under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause instead. Even if we grant several well-
established assumptions that enhance the scope of the government’s 
commerce power—the assumptions that Congress has the power to 
categorically prohibit interstate trade in marijuana36 and to reach in-
state commerce as necessary to its interstate prohibition37—it does not 
follow that its ancillary power is quite so categorical. Rather, the 
regulation must also be “necessary”—i.e., “convenient, or useful, or 
essential”38—to Congress’s powers over interstate commerce. It must 
be a “means calculated to produce the end.”39  
The argument that the Controlled Substances Act’s broad prohi-
bitions are “necessary and proper” to the interstate commerce power 
relies on potential spillovers from the in-state market to the interstate 
market. The claim about spillovers might or might not be valid. It 
should be taken as a question of reality, not an article of faith. 
In the ordinary case, respect for the political branches of the 
federal government might lead us to presume that there really are 
spillovers addressed by the federal law. But what happens if the 
political branches of a state make a different judgment and maintain 
 
34. See infra Part. II.B for a discussion of the chief exception, Raich. 
35. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3, 18.  
36. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903); States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 120 n.3 (1941). But see Barry Friedman & Genevieve Lakier, 
“To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the Commerce Power, 2012 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 257 (2012). 
37. See Houston E. and W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate 
Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914); Darby, 312 U.S. at 122. But see 
M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) (“The power 
of . . . regulating commerce . . . cannot be implied as incidental to other 
powers.”). 
38. M‘Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413. 
39. Id. at 413–14. 
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that the spillovers can be contained? If they do, the Controlled 
Substances Act’s categorical prohibition on in-state marijuana will be 
“convenient, or useful, or essential,”40 and therefore constitutional, 
only if the state-law regime will not work. That might be true, but it 
should not be irrebuttably presumed. 
In other words, the federal power to reach in-state commerce is 
ultimately contingent on circumstances. It depends on how that in-
state commerce relates to federally enumerated powers. The effects of 
a state regulatory regime are simply one such kind of circumstance. 
Such state regulations have sometimes been regarded with a wary eye, 
but as I will explain, they ought to be tolerated—even welcomed—
instead.  
The same analysis ought to hold if the case is looked at through 
the lens of the Commerce Clause alone rather than the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. As Alison LaCroix has noted, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Raich “blended the commerce and necessary and proper 
discussions to such a degree that [the] opinion reads as though they 
were a single unit of analysis.”41 And the same is true more generally 
of much of its twentieth-century Commerce Clause jurisprudence.42  
Some founding-era materials engage in a similar blending. 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison both argued that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause was only “declaratory” of how the 
enumerated powers would have been construed on their own.43 The 
Court’s analysis in M‘Culloch v. Maryland44 proceeds the same way.45 
So regardless of whether the analysis is located, as a formal 
matter, in the Necessary and Proper Clause or in the Commerce 
Clause itself,46 the point remains: Congress has no power to regulate 
 
40. Id. at 413. 
41. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 Yale L.J. 
2044, 2069 (2014). 
42. Id.; see also Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, The PPACA in 
Wonderland, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 269, 282 (2012) (arguing that the 
two should be untangled). 
43. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 
Yale L.J. 1738, 1750 (2013) (citing The Federalist No. 33 at 158 
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) 
& James Madison, Speech on Feb. 2, 1791, reprinted in Legislative 
and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 
39, 42 (photo. reprint 2008) (1832)).  
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
45. Baude, supra note 43, at 1753–54 (discussing M‘Culloch, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) at 409–12). 
46. I am putting to one side the question of whether the federal government 
could use the treaty power to support its marijuana ban, which was not 
discussed in Raich. Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice: Misguided Pro-
hibitions and Realistic Controls 262–64 (2008). That question 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
522 
in-state commerce as such. Rather, Congress can regulate it only to 
the extent it is part of the core power to regulate interstate com-
merce. Therefore, when in-state commerce has been separated from 
the interstate market over which Congress has power, Congress ought 
not to have the power to regulate in-state commerce. 
This point is also in harmony with the more general theory of 
“collective action federalism” put forward by Robert Cooter and Neil 
Siegel.47 Under this view, Congress’s Article I powers are generally 
supposed to occupy the field of all conduct that the several states 
would be unable to properly regulate themselves. Once again, if the 
states enact and enforce rules that prevent direct interstate spillovers, 
then there is no problem that triggers Congress’s constitutional 
authority.  
Cooter and Siegel write the following:  
If there is no spillover problem for state policing, then states 
and localities should be permitted to go their own way as far as 
constitutional federalism is concerned. But if there is a spill-
over—for example, medical marijuana use in California makes it 
more difficult to police drug traffickers at the Arizona border—
then there is a rationale for federal intervention.48  
Cooter and Siegel appear to credit the Court’s conclusion in Raich 
that there were spillovers,49 but presumably if there were not, their 
conclusion would flip. 
 
would depend on the exact requirements of the treaties the United 
States has signed, see Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the 
United States, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1301, 1316–18 (2013), on the resolution 
of the constitutional question avoided in Bond v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 2077 (2014), and perhaps on the same questions of state 
implementation discussed in this Article. Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 438 (2006) 
(requiring more than “invocation of . . . general interests” in alleged 
conflict between treaties and religious exemption from the Controlled 
Substances Act). 
47. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010). 
But see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain 
Federalism Doctrine?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 217 (2014). For an argument 
that a focus on spillovers is also the “hidden functional logic” of modern 
preemption doctrine, see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1370–72 (2006). 
48. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 47, at 164. 
49. Id. (“Given the inability to distinguish marijuana used for medicinal 
purposes from marijuana used for other purposes . . . California’s auth-
orization of marijuana use for medicinal purposes might make it more 
difficult for other states to ban marijuana use.”). 
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The claim that state regulatory regimes should matter to federal 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is thus a subset of the 
claim that actual facts should matter. One could reject this claim if 
one thinks that federal power can never depend on any facts or 
developments after a law has been enacted. There is a hint of this 
view in Raich’s reference to “shifting” developments “uncontrolled” 
by Congress. It is defended more explicitly and more systematically 
by Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz.50 For now I will say that this extends 
the Necessary and Proper Clause beyond even the broad logic of the 
twentieth-century cases. 
Alternatively, one might reject this claim because of a suspicion 
about states. The idea might be that allowing state action to be 
relevant to federal power would be a wedge for nullification, secession, 
and the usual bogeymen of constitutional federalism. But constitu-
tional history and structure suggest that there is good reason for state 
law to matter. 
Most fundamentally, there is nothing wrong with federal author-
ities occasionally yielding to state institutions. As Heather Gerken has 
recently written, the Supreme Court’s most successful federalism doc-
trines “look to the states in describing the limits of federal power.”51 
Gerken acknowledges that this “might seem odd . . . [b]ut the Court 
does so for a reason. It marks the outer limits of federal authority by 
identifying the bounds of state power, much the way an artist 
designates a shape using negative space.”52 
Gerken provides several examples, but here are a few of my own: 
When the Constitution was adopted and under settled practice for 
many decades thereafter, the federal government was thought not to 
have a general independent power of eminent domain.53 This meant 
that when the federal government needed specific parcels of land for 
federal projects, like roads, lighthouses, or even military bases, it had 
to rely on state eminent domain power to take the land if the owner 
would not sell at an acceptable price.54  
But one need not go nearly so far to accept the relevance of state 
regulation to federal power. Important doctrines today continue to 
 
50. See infra Part II.B. 
51. Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 Harv. L. 
Rev. 85, 96 (2014). 
52. Id. To be sure, Gerken also says that the theory of state sovereignty 
that underlies these negative-space cases is “mostly claptrap,” but even 
then she acknowledges that “one should give the devil his due. The 
sovereignty account has managed to generate reasonably coherent 
doctrine.” Id. at 99. 
53. See generally Baude, supra note 43. 
54. See id. at 1761–71 (discussing the early history of federal eminent 
domain). 
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reflect a constitutional faith in state institutions. For instance, the 
abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris55 generally forbids federal 
courts from entertaining a civil rights lawsuit to enjoin a pending 
state prosecution, because of principles of federalism that inform the 
courts’ equitable powers.56 An injunction can only issue if there is no 
adequate remedy at law, and as a rule, a state’s own criminal justice 
system is presumed to be adequate. Hence, a criminal defendant must 
allow state institutions the first chance to handle their federal claims.  
The presumptive faith in state institutions is not absolute. 
Younger abstention does not apply if the prosecution is brought for 
purposes of harassment—i.e., with indifference to whether the 
prosecution succeeds or fails.57 Nor does it apply if a challenged law is 
so obviously unconstitutional that there is no good-faith way for the 
state to uphold it.58 And there may be other “extraordinary circum-
stances” or “unusual situations” where Younger does not apply.59 But 
in the mine run of criminal cases, state institutions are assumed to be 
adequate, with federal courts intervening only as a backstop if 
something can be shown to have gone wrong. 
At a more general level, a rule that made federal power turn on 
state law would also create good incentives for states to affirmatively 
address potential problems. It is fortunate that Colorado has worked 
to harness creative energy into a peaceful market. But there were 
certainly incentives working against it. There is no guarantee other 
than the grace of a few executive branch officials that the Colorado 
experiment will be allowed to persist. (Remember “Hamsterdam”?)60 
And the federal statutory ban, even if it is not enforced criminally, 
threatens to put marijuana businesses outside the normal tools of law 
and order, like banks, lawyers, and contracts. 
A constitutional ruling based on state law would provide both 
incentives and protection for well-regulated experiments like Colo-
rado’s. The possibility of immunity from federal regulation would 
inspire lawmakers to address potentially problematic spillovers rather 
 
55. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  
56. Id. at 44–45. 
57. Id. at 53; see also Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103, 1115 
n.36 (1977) (discussing jurisprudence on “bad-faith harassment”). 
58. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54; see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 
434, 446–47 (1977) (noting that the lower court erred in rejecting the 
application of Younger in part because the allegedly offending state 
statute was not “flagrantly and patently violative of express 
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
59. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54; see, e.g., Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. 
Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 
60. The Wire: Hamsterdam (HBO television broadcast Oct. 10, 2004). 
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than ignoring them as somebody else’s problem. It would also 
encourage state officials to continue to ensure, over time, that the 
safeguards were effective in reality, not just on paper. In other words, 
states would have a reason to be responsible.61  
Such a constitutional ruling would also provide protection for 
investments in those experiments once they succeeded. It takes econo-
mic capital and political capital to create a well-functioning market, 
especially where there has not been one before. The shadowy legal 
status of marijuana thus deters financial investment.62 It also takes 
political will to allow such local experiments to proceed when they are 
contrary to the political fortunes of the ruling majority.63 Indeed, 
delegations from Colorado and Washington have called upon the 
federal government to “provide more regulatory clarity” and reduce 
the “uncertainty” faced by citizens in their states.64 
One important new statutory proposal suggests that a similar 
framework could and should be enacted by Congress.65 It proposes an 
amendment to the Controlled Substances Act that would allow the 
Attorney General to exempt states from the Act’s marijuana 
provisions for up to two years. Under that proposal, the Attorney 
General would be required to exempt a state unless he or she deter-
 
61. I am assuming that such regulations would not raise any “dormant 
commerce clause” problems because they would be in service of the 
federal ban on interstate marijuana trade. Cf. United States v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 304 n.9 (1953) (discussing state 
regulation of interstate commerce that is specifically authorized by 
Congress and therefore poses no dormant commerce clause problems). 
Even if that assumption is wrong, there are other arguments that such 
regulations would withstand dormant-commerce scrutiny. See Brannon 
Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Ob-
stacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 567 (2015); Brannon P. Denning, One Toke over the (State) Line: 
Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 
2279, 2291–99 (2014) (applying a dormant commerce clause analysis to 
Colorado’s nonresident purchase limit). 
62. See Adrian A. Ohmer, Investing in Cannabis: Inconsistent Government 
Regulation and Constraints on Capital, 3 Mich. J. Private Equity & 
Venture Cap. L. 97, 108–18 (2013). 
63. See Lance McMillian, Drug Markets, Fringe Markets, and the Lessons of 
Hamsterdam, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 849, 882–91 (2012). 
64. Letter from Senators Patty Murray, Mark Udall, Maria Cantwell & 
Michael F. Bennett to Denis McDonough, White House Chief of Staff, & 
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. (July 28, 2014), available at http://www. 
murray.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/075fc29f-3a87-4018-b412-3d22da 
1808f9/072514---wa-co-letter-final.pdf (on file with Case Western 
Reserve Law Review). 
65. Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, 
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 74 (2015). 
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mined that the state’s laws would result in interstate spillovers, distri-
bution to minors, or harm to certain other federal interests.66  
I have no quarrel with that statutory proposal, but the same 
regime could be created through constitutional law, and, in fact, there 
are good reasons that it should be. A basic goal of federalism doctrine 
is to harness the creative energies of both levels of government.67 That 
is part of the constitutional plan, not something to be left up to 
Congress’s discretion.  
To be sure, not every state’s current marijuana regime would 
obviously satisfy the appropriate constitutional test. As I’ve noted, for 
instance, there are arguments that Colorado’s marijuana market sees 
a substantial amount of diversion to interstate black markets.68 
Rather, my point is that constitutional doctrine should have given 
states more of an incentive to take charge of their own policies and 
markets. Indeed, the potential tragedy of the current approach is that 
we may not ever see what kind of creative and effective regulatory 
approaches states are capable of, because they are given no particular 
reason to pursue them. 
Finally, it is important to be clear that this is not a call for 
nullification.69 It is not even a denial of Congress’s power to regulate 
in-state marijuana in some circumstances. It would simply hold that 
the constitutionality of federal law under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause must be judged under the circumstances, and that those 
circumstances should importantly include a state’s own success at 
solving the problem Congress has the power to address. 
B. Some Counterarguments 
One challenge faced by the plaintiffs in Raich was how to face 
down the Supreme Court’s precedent in Wickard v. Filburn.70 In 
Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulations of wheat 
extending even to wheat that was grown and consumed on a single 
farm and therefore never entered commerce—interstate or otherwise.71 
And while many have suggested that Wickard’s view of federal power 
may be overly enthusiastic, the Supreme Court does not seem to be 
interested in overturning it.  
 
66. Id. at 120–21. 
67. See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1498–99. 
68. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
69. For thoughts on nullification, see instead Ernest Young, Modern-Day 
Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in an Age of 
Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769, 
794 (2015) (“Nullification is dead . . . . Long live nullification.”). 
70. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
71. Id. at 125. 
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But nothing about the state-law view of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause challenges Wickard. The Court could have continued to 
assume that Congress can regulate the in-state production and 
consumption of an agricultural commodity because of its relationship 
to the interstate market. 
In Wickard, the Court held that “even if appellee’s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.”72 In Raich, however, 
California law attempted to eliminate this effect: It tried to cut medi-
cal marijuana off from the interstate drug market by limiting 
consumption to Californians and to medical purposes.73 It also en-
forced these requirements both through individual ID requirements74 
and by requiring the intervention of doctors, who could be sanctioned 
for failing to enforce the state’s rules.75 
By contrast, there was no sign of such a state attempt in 
Wickard. So there was nothing to push against the broad federal def-
inition of the market to “embrace all that may be sold without pen-
alty but also what may be consumed on the premises.”76 
That leads us to Raich. The dissents in Raich did argue that 
California state law was relevant, though this point was entangled 
with some of their larger disputes with the majority. Justice 
O’Connor argued that “[t]he Government ha[d] not overcome empir-
ical doubt” that legal California marijuana had an effect on the inter-
state market.77 Justice Thomas argued that California law “set[] 
respondents’ conduct apart from other intrastate producers and users 
of marijuana,” which made “[t]his class of intrastate users . . . dis-
tinguishable from others.”78 But because of their broader disputes 
with the majority, the dissents did not articulate the role of states 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause in detail.  
The majority’s chief response to this point was contained in one 
sentence of the text (“Just as state acquiescence to federal regulation 
cannot expand the bounds of the Commerce Clause, so too state 
 
72. Id. 
73. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (West Supp. 
2005). 
74. Health & Safety §§ 11362.715–11362.76. 
75. Health & Safety § 11362.5(d); see People v. Spark, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
840, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 2004) (noting that a doctor’s license was 
suspended at the recommendation of undercover police officers). 
76. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119. 
77. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 52–56 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 62–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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action cannot circumscribe Congress’ plenary commerce power.”)79 
The Court further elaborated this reasoning in a long footnote, 
number 38. The footnote said this: 
That is so even if California’s current controls (enacted eight 
years after the Compassionate Use Act was passed) are 
“effective,” as the dissenters would have us blindly presume, 
post, at 53–54 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); post, at 63, 68 (opinion 
of Thomas, J.). California’s decision (made 34 years after the 
CSA was enacted) to impose “stric[t] controls” on the “cultiva-
tion and possession of marijuana for medical purposes,” post, at 
62 (Thomas, J., dissenting), cannot retroactively divest 
Congress of its authority under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, 
Justice Thomas’ urgings to the contrary would turn the 
Supremacy Clause on its head, and would resurrect limits on 
congressional power that have long since been rejected. See post, 
at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 424, (1819)) (“‘To impose on 
[Congress] the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot 
control, which another government may furnish or withhold, 
would render its course precarious, the result of its measures 
uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, 
which might disappoint its most important designs, and is 
incompatible with the language of the constitution’”). 
Moreover, in addition to casting aside more than a century of 
this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is noteworthy 
that Justice Thomas’ suggestion that States possess the power 
to dictate the extent of Congress’ commerce power would have 
far-reaching implications beyond the facts of this case. For 
example, under his reasoning, Congress would be equally power-
less to regulate, let alone prohibit, the intrastate possession, 
cultivation, and use of marijuana for recreational purposes, an 
activity which all States “strictly contro[l].” Indeed, his ration-
ale seemingly would require Congress to cede its constitutional 
power to regulate commerce whenever a State opts to exercise 
its “traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.” Post, at 
66 (dissenting opinion).80 
Footnote 38 overstates how doctrinally radical it would be to give a 
role to state law. 
 
79. Id. at 29 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). It did go on to provide 
some speculation that the state scheme was still likely to have an effect 
on the interstate market. Id. at 30–32. 
80. Id. at 29 n.38. 
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As for the sentence in the body of the opinion,81 it is a non-
sequitur. State “acquiescence” has been held irrelevant to the com-
merce power because expanding and contracting federal power are not 
symmetrical. In addition, it is dis-analogous to compare a state’s 
litigating position to the creation of a state institution. The question 
is not whether state desire is relevant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause but rather whether state action can change the referents of the 
Clause. 
As for the footnote, the holding and reasoning of M‘Culloch do 
not require one to categorically reject the relevance of state enforce-
ment regimes. M‘Culloch gives Congress broad discretion to choose 
the means necessary for achieving its permissible ends; but the discre-
tion is not unlimited, and M‘Culloch repeatedly emphasized the 
connection between means and ends. 
M‘Culloch repeatedly stresses that the federal government’s 
powers cannot result in “a dependence . . . on [the governments] of 
the States,” or on “the necessity of resorting to means . . . which 
another government may furnish or withhold, . . . .”82 But the pro-
posed state-law doctrine would not do that. Federal law would be-
come unconstitutional only if a state law actually addressed the harm 
to any federal interests (to the satisfaction of the relevant interpreter, 
under the relevant standard).83 There would be no state power to 
“withhold” effective federal enforcement and no “dependence” because 
federal law remains available as a backstop. 
In that context, I would add that M‘Culloch’s statement (not 
quoted in Raich) that “the existence of state banks can have no 
possible influence on the question”84 should not be extended to the 
modern spillover context. It suggests a formal separation between 
state and federal spheres of activity that predates the twentieth-
century cases that allowed Congress to reach in-state commerce in the 
first place. Since the premise of modern regulation of in-state 
commerce is its relationship to interstate commerce, it no longer 
makes sense to ignore state institutions that are relevant to that 
relationship. 
 
81. The text also contained a citation to United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941), which says, like many similar cases from the period, that 
Congress’s Commerce “power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by 
the exercise or non-exercise of state power.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 
(quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 114). But as I’ve discussed, the marijuana 
cases present the different question of whether the in-state activity falls 
within that non-enlarged, non-diminished power. 
82. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819). 
83. See infra Part III for a discussion of interpreters and standards. 
84. M‘Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424. 
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As for the Raich majority’s complaint that this logic could 
“equally” extend to the “use of marijuana for recreational purposes,”85 
that might be so. It is true that the state-law theory would apply as 
much to state laws about recreational marijuana as to state laws 
about medical marijuana. It is unclear why the Court deemed that so 
implausible.  
That said, as a practical matter medical marijuana laws seem 
more likely to be upheld under a state-influenced theory. Medical 
marijuana laws involve doctors and other professionals as part of the 
state distribution regime. Medicine is already regulated, meaning that 
there is an existing network of enforcement to tap. Moreover, doctors 
hold lucrative professional licenses and therefore have more to lose if 
they misbehave. So perhaps medical marijuana regimes are more 
likely to be spillover-free. 
Moving on from Raich itself, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz is one of 
the only scholars to focus on and defend footnote 38. Indeed, he 
argues that the majority underplayed its hand, writing that the 
statement “is exactly right, but it does not belong in footnote 38. It 
belongs at the beginning.”86 Further, he says, “The opinion that 
follows should have been brief indeed, because the implications of that 
one sentence are enough to end the case.”87 
Rosenkranz’s defense of the theory is different from the Court’s, 
and it does not rely on M‘Culloch or on a structural assertion in 
federal supremacy. Instead, Rosenkranz derives his version of footnote 
38 from the Constitution’s text. As he elaborates in a pair of articles, 
constitutional challenges must always be attentive to the “who” and 
the “when”—what government actor has violated the Constitution, 
and by doing what, at what time?88 
In enumerated-powers challenges, he claims, the only possible 
violator is Congress, and state law cannot be relevant: 
If the Constitution was violated here, it must be Congress that 
violated it. . . . [I]f Congress did violate the Constitution, then 
it did so decades ago, when it made the law. And so subsequent 
changes in state law cannot retroactively create a constitutional 
violation.89 
And again: 
 
85. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 n.38 (2005) (emphasis in original!). 
86. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1209, 1279 (2010). 
87. Id. 
88. See generally id.; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the 
Constitution, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1018 (2011). 
89. Rosenkranz, supra note 86, at 1279. 
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The when must be the moment that Congress made the law. 
The current state of state law cannot matter, because it cannot 
have “retroactive” effect. Indeed, for the same reason, no facts 
that arise after the enactment of the statute can matter to the 
merits of the claim.90 
While there is much to be said for careful attention to the text of the 
Constitution, Rosenkranz’s textual analysis here relies on a pair of 
additional premises, and the premises do not hold up.91 
One premise is the claim that the subject of an enumerated-
powers challenge is necessarily Congress. Rosenkranz is on his strong-
est ground when he points to provisions like the First Amendment, 
which expresses a prohibition in which Congress is literally the 
subject: “Congress shall make no law . . . .” By its terms, the First 
Amendment restricts only Congress. The President’s actions—for 
example, suppressing speech—must be challenged on separate 
grounds, like due process.92  
But the same logic does not fully apply to federalism challenges. 
To be sure, the grants of power in Article 1, Section 8 do have 
Congress as their subject: “The Congress shall have power . . . .”93 
But as Rosenkranz acknowledges, Article 1, Section 8 is a grant of 
power, not a restriction.94 So a federalism challenge need not claim 
that Congress, in particular, has “violated”95 the Constitution but 
rather that in this circumstance its actions lack legal effect. The 
argument is negative (“there is no power”) rather than positive (“X 
has violated”).96 Reoriented this way, the claim is that one is at 
liberty to grow and use marijuana for some purposes and no one at 
the federal level—neither Congress nor the Drug Enforcement 
Agency—has the power to displace it in this case.  
 
90. Id. 
91. The following critique expands on thoughts first published in William 
Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 Ind. L.J. 303, 319–21 (2011). 
92. See Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First 
Word, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 601, 604–16 (2013) (“Some of the cases in 
which courts have found that the executive branch has violated the 
First Amendment should perhaps be recast as cases in which the 
executive branch has violated the Due Process Clause.”); Nathan S. 
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1723 (2012). 
93. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
94. Rosenkranz, supra note 86, at 1275. 
95. Id. at 1279. 
96. See generally John Harrison, Power, Duty, and Facial Invalidity, 16 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 501, 508–12, 514–19 (2013) (distinguishing between 
claims based on lack-of-power and claims based on violation-of-duty). 
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Moreover, if one does wish to look to a textual provision that says 
specifically that the limits of national power cannot be exceeded, the 
most relevant one is the Tenth Amendment, which says that “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”97 This provision does not make reference to any 
particular branch of the federal government and most naturally 
encompasses all of them. It reserves power from both Congress and 
the executive. 
The second premise is that any constitutional challenge that does 
address Congress is necessarily premised on the facts in place at the 
time Congress acted.98 Rosenkranz draws on an analogy to the 
criminal law,99 but as I’ve written before, even the criminal law 
sometimes recognizes “acts whose criminality turns on their 
subsequent effects.”100  
Perhaps more fundamentally, it is not at all clear that criminal 
law provides the right analogy here. Again, federalism challenges are a 
claim that federal action exceeds (or partly exceeds or potentially 
exceeds) granted authority, not necessarily that a specific 
constitutional duty was violated.101 So perhaps a better analogy is to 
architecture.102 Like a house upon a well-laid foundation, Congress 
must make laws on the basis of underlying constitutional authority. 
Even if that authority was fully adequate at the time the law was 
passed, it can erode over time because of subsequent events. And if it 
does erode, part of the law, like part of the house, must fall down. 
One can also put the analogies aside and just talk common sense. 
Sometimes a law is constitutionally justified specifically because of 
certain real-world conditions—that it is “necessary and proper” for 
effectuating another power, or that it is an “appropriate” way to 
enforce rights against recalcitrant states.103 If the real-world conditions 
go away, so does the justification. There is no ex ante reason to think 
that all prior exercises of power are “grandfathered” in when 
circumstances eat away at their constitutional basis.  
The foregoing analysis assumes more generally that it is possible 
to raise a so-called “as-applied” federalism challenge to a federal 
statute—at least in the sense that one can say that a certain subclass 
 
97. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
98. Rosenkranz, supra note 86, at 1279. 
99. Id. at 1212–13, 1212 n.9. 
100. Baude, supra note 91, at 320. 
101. See Harrison, supra note 96, at 502. 
102. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 Ind. L.J. 671 (2002). 
103. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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of a federal statute’s coverage is unconstitutional.104 (Note that using 
a subclass, and a state-defined subclass, eases some of the difficulties 
raised by as-applied challenges where it is unclear what the relevant 
class of activity should be.) 
Some scholars and courts have read the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Raich to entirely foreclose as-applied challenges that a statute 
exceeds the commerce authority.105 As a doctrinal matter, I believe 
that is an overreading of Raich,106 which committed the more 
particular and limited error I address above. But if I am wrong, then 
that implication of Raich ought also to be limited to the extent 
necessary to disregard footnote 38. 
III. Operationalizing the Doctrine 
So it works in theory, but can it work in practice? 
A. In the Judiciary 
It is possible that footnote 38’s rejection of state law does not 
really derive from a first-order view about the scope of constitutional 
power but rather from a view about judicial capacity. If so, then the 
more relevant question is how, as a practical matter, courts could 
account for state regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
As is often the case with those who propose a new doctrinal path, 
I do not claim to know the only way that courts should travel it. 
That said, it seems to me that courts ought to ask two questions. 
First, does the state have a regime that seems likely, on its face, to 
eliminate whatever spillover problem Congress would otherwise have 
the power to address? For instance, does the state limit the purchase 
of marijuana to residents, limit the purchase quantities in a way that 
makes straw buyers infeasible, and also regulate production and sale 
in a way that makes diversion unlikely?  
Second, if the regime seems likely to work on its face, is there also 
evidence that it works in practice? For example, does the state 
allocate significant resources to enforcement at the border or other 
 
104. This is in accordance with Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and 
Federalism, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 905–07, 911 (2005). 
105. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and 
the Commerce Clause, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 41, 51 (2006) (noting that “the 
outcome in [Raich] strongly suggests that the Court simply disfavors as-
applied challenges altogether in the Commerce Clause area”); see also 
Richard H. Fallon Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 936 (2011) (noting that “Raich can be read” this 
way). 
106. See generally Misha Tseytlin, As-Applied Commerce Clause Challenges, 
16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 479, 494 (2013) (“This reaction rests on an 
overreading of Raich.”). 
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relevant nexus? Do studies or reports demonstrate a large amount of 
diversion?107 States that have any interest in the preservation of their 
regulatory authority could themselves be the ones to amass some of 
this evidence and provide it to the court, whether as litigants or 
intervenors or amici. 
Answering these questions should be no harder in principle than 
any other judgment about the scope of necessity. If one thinks that 
the judiciary had the capacity to say, as it did in United States v. 
Lopez108 and United States v. Morrison,109 that the law was too 
attenuated from any enumerated power, then in principle it should 
have the same ability when the attenuation is caused by state 
regulation. Contrariwise, if one is dubious of the entire project of 
judicially enforced limits on the enumerated powers, then one does 
not have any special complaint about the role of state law and one 
does not need footnote 38. Either way, the point is that looking to 
state law and state institutions does not pose a special judicial 
capacity problem. 
In any event, there might be simpler ways to give some relevance 
to the role of state law through our current doctrinal frameworks. 
With some wrinkles, the Court often says that its review of Congress’s 
enumerated powers judgments is subject only to “rational basis” 
scrutiny.110 As Ernie Young has observed, that standard usually 
assumes that there is only one political decision to defer to.111 Courts 
might instead shift the level of scrutiny in cases where two govern-
ments have made differing considered judgments. If the state has its 
own enforcement regime that seems plausibly designed to eliminate 
spillovers (we might say that there must be a “rational basis” for 
believing it will do so), then perhaps the court would apply some 
variation of “intermediate” scrutiny instead. This method would use 
 
107. One can also imagine different ways to calibrate how much of the 
spillover problem the state must control. One possibility is that the 
state must eliminate all but de minimis spillovers. Another is that it 
must do so at least as well as the proposed federal rule would. 
108. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
109. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“‘[S]imply 
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (citation omitted))). 
110. E.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)). 
111. Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the 
Federalist Revival After Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32–33 
(2005) (explaining that rational basis “has its impetus in the 
institutional advantages that legislative bodies enjoy over courts” but 
noting the complication in unique situations where the case “involves 
not one legislature but two”). Raich, again, is an exception. 
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state law to frame the amount of deference before proceeding to the 
court’s other doctrinal tools, whatever they may be.  
One can imagine variations on this approach as well. For 
instance, one might wish to give more deference to Congress when it 
has made a specific judgment that the specific state-law regime is not 
likely to be effective and less when it has not considered the problem. 
The Controlled Substances Act categorically banned marijuana more 
than twenty-five years before any state introduced an attempt to 
regulate in-state marijuana and control interstate spillovers. And 
Congress has never given any formal indication that it thinks the 
state regimes are unlikely to be effective, since it has not returned to 
marijuana’s classification at all since the Act’s enactment. Courts 
might respond to this dynamic by adopting an approach like so: 
When a state introduces a plausible regime for controlling spillovers, 
the federal law is presumptively judged under a stricter standard of 
scrutiny. If Congress responds with a specific, plausible doubt about 
the state regime, the level of scrutiny recedes back to the lower 
level.112 
Aziz Huq has expressed skepticism about the judicial project of 
sorting different enumerated powers claims into seemingly different 
levels of scrutiny.113 Huq’s skepticism focuses on the Court’s current 
project of seemingly invoking different levels of scrutiny for different 
congressional choices—the invocation of different enumerated powers 
or the regulation of economic vs. noneconomic activity under the 
Commerce Clause.114 Huq suggests that varying the levels of scrutiny 
along those axes allows both legislative arbitrage and judicial activism 
and cannot be justified under most standard normative accounts.115  
A level of scrutiny that varies with a state’s plausibly effective 
regulatory regime, however, ought not raise the same objections. 
Because the level of scrutiny does not depend on congressional action, 
there is no serious opportunity for congressional arbitrage; nor does it 
seem to produce the same kind of “agency slack” that Huq criticizes. 
At the same time, the variation in scrutiny is justifiable under several 
interpretive theories: As a formal matter, it is a closer approximation 
of Congress’s incidental powers, and as a practical matter, it provides 
 
112. See id. at 31–32 (suggesting a “process-based” “clear statement” rule); 
see also Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Ac-
countability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. 
Rev. 80, 103–08 (1991) (proposing that acts of Congress that implicate 
fundamental rights without adequate consideration be remanded to 
Congress). 
113. See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurispru-
dence, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575 (2013). 
114. Id. at 586–612. 
115. Id. at 613–51. 
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sensible incentives for state participation in federal contestation. I 
would therefore submit that it is consistent with Huq’s ambition to 
“render the political and policy stakes of such judicial review more 
transparent in ways that enable more meaningful public discussion.”116  
B. In the Executive Branch 
Even if one is pessimistic about the ability of courts to coherently 
operationalize this theory, there remains another way in which the 
state-law theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause could work. It 
could be implemented through executive power. Such executive-
branch constitutional implementation would be an improvement on 
the current state of marijuana enforcement. 
Presidential implementation of the Constitution is well-
established. There is scholarly and official disagreement about exactly 
how broad that power of implementation is—for instance, whether 
there is a categorical duty to ignore all unconstitutional statutes,117 or 
a much more discretionary power.118 There is also disagreement about 
how much the President’s constitutional judgments should be subord-
inated to those of the Supreme Court.119 I will not wade into that 
debate in this Article, but many of these theories could accept the 
President’s ability to implement the reading of constitutional doctrine 
I suggest here.120 
 
116. Id. at 654. 
117. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2008). 
118. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President (Nov. 2, 
1994) available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinion
s/1994/11/31/op-olc-v018-p0199_0.pdf (on file with Case Western Re-
serve Law Review). 
119. Compare Prakash, supra note 117, at 1617 (proposing that “the Pres-
ident has a duty to disregard statutes he believes are unconstitutional”) 
and David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The 
President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 61, 63 
(2000) (challenging a “court-centered approach to the scope of the 
President’s non-enforcement power”), with Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, supra note 118 (“[I]f the President believes that the Court 
would sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the President 
should execute the statute, notwithstanding his of beliefs about the 
constitutional issue.”), and Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 12–13 (2000) (“Presidential non-enforcement 
policy should respect judicial precedent . . . but afford greater weight to 
the President’s views when the President possesses special intuitional 
expertise of relevance.”). 
120. For instance, under Prakash’s framework, Supreme Court precedent is, 
at best, a persuasive authority. See Prakash, supra note 117, at 1679. 
Under Dellinger’s framework, nonenforcement would depend in part on 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
537 
The President could implement this view through official 
memoranda concluding that marijuana laws are unconstitutional as 
applied to lawful in-state marijuana in particular states, like Cali-
fornia or Colorado. Alternatively, rather than making specific judg-
ments about which states’ regimes are permissible, the administration 
could release a list of criteria relevant to both current and prospective 
regimes. 
One advantage of such executive implementation is that the 
President can implement doctrine in a different way from the courts. 
All constitutional interpreters face the problem of translating terse 
constitutional commands into specific tests applicable to the facts at 
hand. We are more familiar with the implementing doctrines of 
courts, which fill up the law reports, but the executive does it too.  
Moreover, the executive branch can craft constitutional doctrine 
differently than the courts. For instance, many concerns about the 
need for judicial deference in crafting doctrine do not apply to the 
executive branch. The courts are not politically accountable; the 
President is. Doctrines established by the courts are inflexible and 
difficult to revise; the President’s need not be. The courts lack 
expertise and information necessary to make policy judgments; the 
President does not.121 To be sure, the President’s implementation is 
still ultimately supposed to be legal interpretation, not pure policy 
analysis, but it is legal interpretation under a different set of 
institutional constraints and abilities.  
For instance, the current nonenforcement memos list eight “en-
forcement priorities,” which include preventing interstate diversion, 
keeping lawful and illicit markets separate, and keeping profits from 
flowing to drug cartels.122 Under a constitutional implementation 
approach, some of those priorities could be rewritten as state incent-
ives. For instance, the President might publish a memo saying that 
states should endeavor to keep in-state marijuana out of the interstate 
market and away from interstate drug trafficking organizations. If a 
state could ensure that out-of-state diversions fall below a certain 
level, it would be entitled to a constitutional carve-out from the 
federal ban. This would give states strong motive to police doctors 
and dispensaries that might flout the state’s rules.  
Such a regime would turn Justice Stevens’s concerns about the 
effectiveness of state law on their head. Rather than asking courts to 
“blindly presume” that state law is effective, it would ask the 
 
the Supreme Court’s willingness to reinterpret or limit previous deci-
sions if presented with the issue. See Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, supra note 118. 
121. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive 
Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1240–44 (2006). 
122. Cole Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
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government to create incentives for state law to actually become 
effective and then give that state law legal effect when it does so. For 
instance, because of low sales (and hence low tax revenue), Colorado 
lawmakers have not fully funded their enforcement regime.123 Federal 
incentives might alter that behavior. 
Moreover, a constitutional nonenforcement regime would be more 
legitimate and stable than the status quo. Right now, the President 
has allowed the state marijuana experiments to persist by simply 
declining (for the most part) to enforce the marijuana laws in those 
states. He has invoked the tradition of prosecutorial discretion to do 
so. But as Zachary Price has shown, federal prosecutorial discretion 
has not traditionally extended to “prospective licensing of prohibited 
conduct.”124 Rather, prosecutorial discretion has traditionally been 
limited to resource-allocation decisions and case-specific equitable 
judgments.125 
Specifically analyzing the most recent marijuana enforcement 
policies, Price concludes that one of the administration’s most recent 
nonenforcement policies “creeps closer to an [impermissible] express 
promise of nonenforcement,” though it “is defensible insofar as it 
promises only to focus resources on particular types of cases, not to 
avoid prosecution altogether.”126 Moreover, even if the current regime 
is on the permissible side of the line, Price concludes that “a more 
definite nonenforcement policy, such as state officials and marijuana 
advocates sought, would exceed the Executive’s proper role by 
effectively suspending a federal statute.”127 Prosecutorial discretion 
does not permit the executive to fix the pall of legal uncertainty that 
hangs over state markets and regulations. 
A regime of constitutional nonenforcement cuts through these 
problems. The current memos expressly warn people and businesses 
that they have no legal right to rely on the promise of nonenforce-
ment.128 That is one of the sources of the legal uncertainty that rend-
 
123. Jennifer Oldham, Colorado Pot Revenue Lags Forecasts as Licensing Is 
Slow, Bloomberg (May 1, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20
14-05-02/colorado-pot-revenue-lags-forecasts-as-licensing-is-slow.html. 
124. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 675 (2014). 
125. Id. Cf. Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and 
Not-Enforcing,” 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 113, 119 n.21 (2007) 
(arguing that prosecutorial discretion is permitted only “on traditional 
grounds, such as the difficulty of proving a hard case or the belief that 
resources should be spent on other individuals who had committed 
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126. Id. at 758 (analyzing Cole Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 12). 
127. Id. at 758–59. 
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ers the current system unstable. By contrast, a constitutional nonen-
forcement memo would amount to a representation by the govern-
ment that marijuana possession was in fact lawful in some circum-
stances. Such representations are potentially judicially enforceable, 
providing a defense to criminal culpability for those who reasonably 
rely on them.129 
A constitutional carve-out could also solve many of the problems 
with banks, lawyers and contracts. In each case, it is the continued 
presence of the federal ban that makes it hard for marijuana market 
participants to access these services. But if the federal ban is 
unconstitutional in a particular state, then within that state there is 
no federal ban in force. A regime of constitutionally based 
nonenforcement therefore could facilitate the personal and state 
investments that may be necessary for marijuana federalism to 
succeed. 
Conclusion 
It is probably clear by now that none of these constitutional 
principles are really limited to marijuana or even to drug prohibition. 
Marijuana legalization is simply the policy context that currently 
happens to cast this problem in the sharpest relief. 
The current doctrinal regime and its acceptance of footnote 38 is 
thus a twofold tragedy. It is first the loss of the chance to harness 
state energy and creativity to responsibly regulate marijuana and 
control interstate spillovers. But it is also the loss of the chance to 
more generally give states a proactive and responsible role in future 
challenges to federal policy. The contours of those debates are hard to 
even guess at now, just as the Raich Court probably did not guess 
that more than one state would legalize recreational marijuana less 
than ten years later. 
Let us hope that future Justices and executive-branch officials are 
more willing to harness the power of state institutions in constitu-
tional doctrine. 
 
 
129. See John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of 
Law, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 37–47 (1997) (discussing Raley v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 423 (1959); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); United States v. 
Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973)). 
